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Women’s Bargaining Power and Educational Expenditures: 
Implications for Subsidy Policy
Park Minsoo,* Oh Jeungil,** and Lee Sora***
Abstract: This study tackles the question of whether the distribution of power in
a family might affect the level of expenditure on each child’s education. We
constructed a direct measure of the bargaining power of a wife and husband
within a household. Our analysis showed that a household spends more money
on children’s education when the wife has a larger voice. We also found that the
marginal effects of a wife’s income lessened when the relative power of the wife
and husband was controlled. Our analysis may imply the effect of a household’s
income will be multiplicative if women’s control of household resources
empowers women. However, if all that matters is the power itself, then giving
money to women without changing their bargaining power will not work toward
our expectations.
Keywords: women, bargaining power, children, educational expenditures, subsidy
policy
INTRODUCTION
In the extensive literature on women’s bargaining power, it has been assumed that
higher women’s bargaining power leads to greater participation in household decision
making (Becker, 1996). When women’s bargaining power increases, children’s welfare
improves due to the fact that woman know better what children need. Therefore, in
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households where the woman has a higher bargaining power, the expenditure share of
items that are positively correlated with children’s welfare, such as health and educa-
tion, would be higher than in households where women have less bargaining power.
It is important to understand the process through which women’s bargaining power
influences the education of children. Sociocultural norms dictate that men and women
have distinct roles within a household. Women are responsible for food production
and child care (Caldwell & Caldwell, 1993). Also, men and women have different
preferences and allocate household resources differently. Women are more likely to
spend resources on education and health (Haddad, Hoddinott, & Adelman, 1997; Von
Braun, 1988; Thomas, 1990).
We may agree that investment in education is needed to enhance its quantity and
the quality, but it is also important to decide how to allocate the educational investment.
In this context, we tackle the question of whether the distribution of power in a family
might affect the level of expenditure on each child’s education. This question is impor-
tant since the appropriate policy depends on the answer. For example, if expenditure
on schooling is larger when mothers have more power in decision making, then we
need to try to make sure that financial subsidies or aid flow into the mothers’ hands;
and if it is not, we may have to allocate resources to increasing the power of women.
In order to determine the relationship between women’s bargaining power and family
educational expenditures, all variables other than women’s bargaining power that
determine educational expenditures should be specified in the model.
In recent years, many theoretical and empirical studies have showed that members
of a given household do not share identical preferences, and one key member does not
determine resource allocations based on his or her preference, as Becker’s “unitary
model” assumes. Critics have argued that the unitary model not only has unrealistic
assumptions but also has limitations in drawing policy implications. One of the most
important limitations is the failure to address the possibility that the effect of public
transfers or policy initiatives may differ depending on the identity of the recipient
(Haddad, Hoddinott, & Alderman 1997).
An alternative to the unitary model is the collective model, in which individuals
with different preferences are treated as basic elements of the analysis, and household
allocation is considered as the outcome of a bargaining process that achieves efficient
allocation among household members. Collective models can be differentiated by the
solution concepts they adopt—either cooperative (Manser & Brown, 1980; McElroy
& Horney, 1981) or noncooperative (Lundberg & Pollak, 1993) Nash equilibrium.
However, both concepts share the common feature of each household member having
his or her own preference, and in contrast to the unitary model, a single household
welfare index is not required.
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Growing evidence has supported the view that different household members,
especially wives and husbands, have different preferences. It showed the effect of the
mother’s income on the investment in children or food- and health-related expenditures
is larger than that of the father’s income. Empirical studies have argued that this
evidence refutes the unitary model because the source of the family’s income does not
play a role within it. Some studies have argued further that the evidence indicates
that bargaining power determines the share of resources allocated to an individual
household member. This argument is intuitively appealing, because a person who
earns more is likely to have more power and a greater voice in household decision
making.
Despite its importance, the notion of power is elusive and difficult to measure.
Several measures of power have been suggested, but few are satisfactory. Many are
based upon the outcome of the bargaining process, which produces the endogeneity
problem if the exogenous measurement of bargaining power is not considered. In a
model of intra-household allocation, labor supply is determined through bargaining
between household members. Non-labor income (Thomas, 1990; Schultz, 1990) can
be thought of as exogenous to labor supply, but since much of non-labor income is
from pensions, earnings from accumulated assets, or unemployment benefits, it is also
the outcome of past labor and retirement decisions. Similar criticism may be applied to
current asset holdings (Doss, 1996).
This study addresses this problem by using a direct measure of power—voice in
household decision making, as constructed from data from the Indonesian Family Life
Survey, which is unique in that it has a section dedicated to the process of household
decision making. Taking advantage of the ability to use a direct measure of power, we
examined determinants of power that have almost never been investigated before.
We also attempted to determine whether there exists an effect of power on children’s
education.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section offers an overview of children’s
education and women’s social status in Indonesia. This is followed by a description
of the data and the main variables, including the measure of power. The next section
discusses the estimation results. Finally, policy implications are presented.
CHILDREN’S EDUCATION AND WOMEN’S 
SOCIAL STATUS IN INDONESIA
The social activities and participation of Indonesian women have increased signifi-
cantly in recent decades. The female enrollment rate for secondary school, which was
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only 23.7 percent in 1981, was 79.1 percent in 2009 (World Bank, 2011). The number
of seats occupied by women in the national parliament (lower and single house) was
40 (8 percent) for 2001-2003 and increased to 101 (18 percent) in the 2009 election
(Inter-parliamentary Union, 2011). The labor force participation rate of women and
girls 15 years or older has risen from 44 percent in 1980 to 52 percent in 2009 (World
Bank, 2011).
These numbers indicate a higher economic and social status for women than in the
past. However, it is still believed that women suffer disproportionately from illiteracy,
poor health, domestic violence, and inadequate nutrition. For example, the illiteracy
rate of women is 17 percent, compared to 10 percent among men (Online Women in
Politics, 2011).
The Indonesian government began promoting elementary education in the late
1960s. Since 1990, six years of elementary school and three years of junior secondary
school are compulsory and free in Indonesia. An additional three years of upper
secondary school are optional (Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, 2011). Although
the enrollment rate for secondary school is high (79.5 percent), the rate for tertiary
school was only 23.5 percent in 2009 (see Figure 1).
This is due to rising costs for higher education. According to the World Bank
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Figure 1. School Enrollment Rates in Indonesia, 1981-2009
(2011), expenditures per student for primary, secondary, and tertiary education are 11.0
percent, 12.5 percent, and 16.2 percent of GDP per capita respectively. The economic
crisis in the late 1990s provided another reason for slower growth of education levels
in Indonesia. Public expenditure for education has increased along with expenditure
for non-formal private education.
DATA AND VARIABLES
The data for this research came from the Indonesian Family Life Survey 2007,
which is a national representative sample of 13,535 households and 44,103 individuals
from 13 Indonesian provinces. The survey is the fourth round of a panel survey.
Therefore, all the household members interviewed in the first round and their spinoffs
were revisited and interviewed.
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Table 1. Definition of Variables
Variable Definition
Edu_exp Educational expenditure for children (million Rp.)
Power Wife’s power / husband’s power
W_nli Wife’s non-labor income (million Rp.)
H_nli Husband’s non-labor income (million Rp.)
W_wages Wife’s wages (million Rp.)
H_wages Husband’s wages (million Rp.)
W_work Dummy variable; 1 if wife is working
H_work Dummy variable; 1 if husband is working
W_edu Wife’s educational level (years)
H_edu Husband’s educational level (years)
W_age Wife’s age (years)
H_age Husband’s age (years)
Quartile1 Dummy variable; 1 if total household expenditure is in the highest group
Quartile2 Dummy variable; 1 if total household expenditure is in the second highest group
Quartile3 Dummy variable; 1 if total household expenditure is in the third highest group
Quartile4 Dummy variable; 1 if total household expenditure is in the lowest group
Size Household size (number of people)
Size_51 Number of me or women aged over 50 years
Anyprivate Dummy variable; 1 if at least one child is enrolled in a private school
Urban Dummy variable; 1 if household is in an urban area 
Since we want to construct a measure of power within the family, our sample
contained only those households with both a husband and a wife. This reduced the
sample to 8,851 households. Those households consisted mostly of parents and their
married child(ren) living in the same household. Each individual answered questions
about decision making. The definitions and summary statistics for all variables used in
this study are presented in tables 1 and 2.
Our measure of wives’ negotiation power consisted of an index of a wife’s power
in comparison to her husband’s. The survey asked interviewees who makes decisions
about different types of expenditures and use of time in the family (see the appendix).
Respondents were allowed to list all those participating in each decision. We constructed
an individual measure of power for each respondent and the power the respondent
assigned to his or her spouse. The weights are the inverse of the number of people
making decisions. For example, if a respondent answered that his wife, male child,
and he jointly made a decision about the children’s clothes, then the husband’s power
was weighted at 1/3.
Consequently, for each family member we could calculate powerhh (the power that
the husband perceives he has in the household), powerhw (the power that the husband
perceives his wife has in the household), powerwh (the power that the wife perceives
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Edu_exp 4,876 1.301 1.529 0 26.07
Power 8,851 1.565 1.074 0 33
W_nli 10,906 7.537 97.685 0 3,000
H_nli 9,772 9.629 169.237 0 13,006
W_wages 4,789 8.141 16.486 -274 401.5
H_wages 8,534 15.825 238.783 -46.4 21,600
W_edu 9,595 8.016 4.128 0 20
H_edu 9,130 8.524 4.218 0 21
W_age 12,183 41.049 14.469 12 94
H_age 10,971 43.486 14.589 11 107
Quartile1 12,910 0.251 0.433 0 1
Quartile2 12,910 0.250 0.433 0 1
Quartile3 12,910 0.250 0.433 0 1
Size 13,469 5.387 2.981 1 39
Urban 13,469 0.547 0.498 0 1
Anyprivate 13,469 0.093 0.291 0 1 
the husband has in the household), and powerww (the power that the wife perceives she
has in the household). Afterwards, for each family, we considered that a valid measure
of power for husband/wife pairs would be as follows:
Husband’s power: Hpower = powerhh + powerwh (1)
Wife’s power: Wpower = powerhw + powerww (2)
Finally, we defined the index of power distribution as the ratio of the husband’s
power to the wife’s power. (If the denominator is zero, then we treated it as one to
avoid dividing by zero.)
Power = Wpower/Hpower (3)
If a conventional division of roles in the household exists, this index may measure
power incorrectly. For example, if cooking, housekeeping, and raising children are
perceived as a women’s job, even if a man has power he can let his spouse decide on
expenditures in these areas. In that case, our power index may overstate the power of the
wife. Concerned with this issue, we constructed a similar index of power for decisions
regarding children and financial decisions. However, the results using an alternative
index did not show any significant differences from those using the power variable.
Another problem with the above measure of power might be that in some cases the
answers are inconsistent (the wife says she decides something while the husband says
the opposite), due to subjectivity. This is one reason for considering power as the sum
of the power a person believes he or she has and the power that person’s spouse
believes he or she has. Another way of avoiding subjectivity is to measure a person’s
power using only the answers on which the husband and wife agreed.
In theory, there are two kinds of model specification for household educational
expenditures. Becker (1991) suggested that household educational expenditures are
determined by a utility maximization framework. Much empirical research considers
children, household, and neighborhood characteristics. Children’s characteristics
include age and gender. Among household characteristics, income or socioeconomic
status is a major determinant of household investment in children’s education. A
demographic factor that affects the household’s decisions is the presence of other
school-age children in the household. Finally, religion can also influence household
decisions about education (Shafiq, 2011).
The second approach is estimating the Engel curve, which relates the budget share
to total household expenditure and household size. The comprehensive Engel curve
includes variables for residential area, education and age of the household head, and
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homeownership. Household composition is entered through linear indicators of the
number of household members in each of several gender-specific demographic categories
(Handa, 1996). For example, Aslam and Kingdon (2008) estimated an Engel curve
linking the budget share of educational expenditure with total household expenditure.
They considered explanatory variables such as household head’s education, gender,
and occupation, and regional dummy variables.
We combined these two approaches in constructing an empirical model. Two types
of income were used in this study: wife and husband’s earnings and non-labor income
received in the past 12 months. Wages are the sum of salary and bonuses earned from
primary and sideline jobs. For the self-employed, business profits are treated as wages.
Non-labor income is defined as the sum of pensions, insurance, arisan (rotating savings
clubs), transfers, bonuses, earnings, and other sources of income. Some previous litera-
ture, including Thomas (1990), used this variable to show the different effects of
men’s and women’s bargaining power. Also, in order to control the effect of household
wealth, we considered quartile variables in the model.
We considered educational expenditures for children aged 4 to 17 years as the
measure of educational expenditures. The reported education expenditures were school
fees (including for registration and exams), school supplies (books, writing supplies,
uniforms, and sports equipment), transportation, pocket money (for transportation,
housing and food, and special courses), and other expenses. Educational expenditure
was reported for each child by the children or their parents and then averaged for each
household; thus it represents expenditure per child. Educational expenditure per child
is expected to be smaller when there are more children in the household.
Generally, the older generation has a more conservative view about the roles of
wife and husband, and this may have a negative effect on the bargaining power of
wives. To take into account these matters, the household size (number of household
members) and proportion of household members aged over 51 years were included as
household characteristics. Since the unit of analysis is not an individual but a family,
we considered age and educational levels of both the husbands and wives. When a
wife is much younger and less educated than her husband, she is likely to have a
smaller voice in decision making. Parents’ educational level can also directly affect
spending for children.
Finally, an additional variable that may influence household educational expendi-
tures is the school type: private or public. Parents are likely to spend more money on
children enrolled in a private school than on children enrolled in a public school. We
also consider whether the household is in an urban area, which may provide a more
women-friendly environment but require more money for raising children.
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ANALYSIS
This section focuses on two models. First, we are interested in the determinants
of our power index. Before investigating the effect of women’s power on children’s
education, we need to examine what factors determine the relative power of the wife
within a household. In equation 4, a vector of explanatory variables (Xj) includes
various household characteristics: income, parents’ education, husband’s and wife’s
ages, and working status. Income, which is believed to be the most important factor,
was measured by non-labor income or wages.
(Power)j = αXj + εj (4)
The estimation results of equation 4 are presented in table 3. The first two columns
of table 3 are the results of running ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for the
total sample (both consistent and inconsistent answers). We consider both non-labor
income (Model I) and wages (Model II) as determinants of power.
The Accuracy of Estimated Costs in Public Investment 45
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Table 3. Determinants of the Wife’s Power
All respondents Consistent respondents only
Model I Model II Model I Model II
W_nli 0.00026 (2.16)** 0.00078 (3.53)***
H_nli -0.00003 (0.59) 0.00000 (0.07)
W_wages 0.00048 (0.34) -0.003 (1.21)
W_work 0.133 (5.94)*** 0.687 (0.61) 0.161 (3.86)*** 0.794 (0.40)
H_work -0.280 (5.86)*** -0.543 (6.34)*** -0.191 (2.08)** -0.269 (1.64)
W_edu 0.003 (0.76) 0.008 (1.08) -0.006 (0.90) -0.007 (0.53)
H_edu -0.023 (6.35)*** -0.038 (5.59)*** -0.031 (4.57)*** -0.044 (3.48)***
W_age 0.003 (1.35) 0.009 (2.05)** -0.000 (0.03) 0.009 (1.01)
H_age 0.002 (0.75) 0.001 (0.24) 0.007 (1.75)* 0.005 (0.61)
Quartile1 0.083 (2.27)** 0.225 (3.05)*** 0.184 (2.71)*** 0.510 (3.72)***
Quartile2 -0.012 (0.36) 0.074 (1.06) 0.086 (1.36) 0.286 (2.21)**
Quartile3 -0.006 (0.17) 0.057 (0.80) 0.049 (0.77) 0.250 (1.90)*
Size 0.013 (3.01)*** 0.029 (3.45)*** 0.013 (1.52) 0.025 (1.58)
Size_51 -0.051 (2.58)*** -0.095 (2.65)*** -0.053 (1.44) -0.089 (1.34)
Urban 0.094 (4.01)*** 0.085 (1.94)* 0.167 (3.81)*** 0.194 (2.40)**
Constant 1.576 (18.49)*** 1.050 (0.93) 1.611 (10.02)*** 0.772 (0.38)
Observations 7,513 3,066 7,029 2,878
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
Notes: The dependent variable is power. Absolute values of the t-statistics are in parentheses.
*** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level
The results are consistent with our expectations: estimates of the wife’s non-labor
income are positive and statistically significant for both samples, although the size of
the estimates is quite small. In contrast, a wife’s wages have no impact on her power.
Wages are a more stable financial resource than non-labor income, and are thus likely
to be used for basic necessities.
However, the effect of non-labor income on bargaining power would be larger than
that of wages. Rather than the size of wages, the working status of the wife and husband
has a significant effect on women’s negotiation power. For example, if the wife works,
then her relative power increases by 0.13, which is 8.5 percent of the average power of
women. Meanwhile, the wife’s voice decreases as the husband’s income increases,
though the estimates are statistically insignificant.
We found three more interesting results in this study. First, in all models, the educa-
tional level of the husband has a negative effect on the wife’s power. Second, women
have more power in richer families as measured by expenditure level. Third, the
proportion of males to females aged over 50 has a negative effect on women’s power.
Many households are composed of more than two generations. These estimates imply
that older family members suppress the wife’s voice within a household by forcing
her to follow the male-favored tradition and by requiring her to work more in the
household.
The second theme that we are interested in is whether more resources are invested
in children by families that endow women with more power. The first result that we
expect from the data is that the estimates of the wife’s income and educational level
would be larger than that of the husband as the previous studies showed.
We also expect to find a significant effect of the power variable itself. That is, we
expect to find that families in which women have a stronger voice spend more money
on their children’s education. If the power variable has a significantly positive effect
on educational expenditures, the effect of the wife’s other characteristics would
become weaker in our model.
We specify a model to capture the effect of a wife’s power on the children’s educa-
tion. The model is formalized as follows:
(Educational expenditures)j = α1(powerj) + ε2(powerj)2 + βXj + εj (5)
Xj includes the same explanatory variables as equation 4 except for the working
status and age of the wife and husband. These are excluded due to concern about
multicollinearity with income variables. Parents’ age is believed to have no relationship
to children’s education. In fact, the estimates of coefficients on age turned out to be
insignificant.
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The Model I and Model II columns in table 4 are the estimation results from OLS
regression. The estimate of the wife’s non-labor income was found to be positive,
while that of the husband’s non-labor income has no statistically meaningful effect on
children’s education. This implies that money in the mother’s hand has a bigger
impact on a child’s welfare than money in the father’s hand. This result is consistent
with what existing studies have shown.
Our main interest is the influence of the mother’s power. The estimation result in
the Model II column shows a positive coefficient of the power variable, which implies
that more is invested in children’s education when the wife is more involved in decisions
about resource distribution within a household.
The estimate of the wife’s non-labor income also becomes smaller if the power
variable is considered as an explanatory variable in the model. Together with the
previous results in table 3, this implies that parents’ income affects educational expen-
ditures through two paths: direct and indirect effect (by changing the bargaining
power within the family). The power variable captured the second effect.
The estimated coefficients of the wife’s education level are 0.03 and 0.036, while
those of the husband’s education are 0.025 and 0.028. These estimates were all signifi-
cant at the 1 percent significance level. Therefore, we can conclude that more educated
parents spend more on educating their children and the mother’s education has a larger
marginal impact. The estimates of the variables also coincide with our expectations.
When a household is in an urban area and the children are enrolled in a private school,
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Table 4. Determinants of Educational Expenditures for Children
Model I Model II Model III
Power – 0.074 (1.71)* 0.077 (1.70)*
Power squared – -0.005 (1.23) -0.005 (1.15)
W_nli 0.000469 (2.07)** 0.000465 (2.05)** 0.000474 (1.98)**
H_nli 0.000211 (1.02) 0.000204 (0.98) 0.000216 (0.99)
W_edu 0.034 (4.55)*** 0.034 (4.51)*** 0.036 (4.47)***
H_edu 0.025 (3.55)*** 0.026 (3.66)*** 0.028 (3.65)***
Quartile 1 1.022 (13.32)*** 1.020 (13.28)*** 1.056 (12.96)***
Quartile 2 0.352 (4.89)*** 0.354 (4.90)*** 0.378 (4.92)***
Quartile 3 0.117 (1.62) 0.120 (1.65)* 0.125 (1.62)
Size -0.010 (1.13) -0.010 (1.19) -0.006 (0.66)
Urban 0.436 (9.35)*** 0.434 (9.26)*** 0.446 (9.00)***
Anyprivate 0.744 (14.75)*** 0.742 (14.71)*** 0.776 (14.57)***
Constant 0.035 (0.40) -0.066 (0.62) -0.214 (1.90)*
Observations 3,748 3,743 3,743
R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.07 (pseudo R2)
*** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level
educational expenditures become higher. Also, wealthy families are more likely to
spend more money on their children’s education.
The power variable is found to be significant only at the 10 percent level. One
possible problem is that a significant number of households (8,936 out of 13,535)
either did not report educational expenditure or reported zero expenditure. Concerned
with the truncation of the dependent variable, we also estimated the Tobit model; these
results are presented as Model III in table 4. Even though the sizes of the estimates
become slightly larger, the qualitative implications of the results are maintained.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this study we constructed a direct measure of the bargaining power of the wife
and husband within a household and investigated whether it affected the children’s
education. Our analysis showed that a household spends more money on children’s
education when the wife has greater bargaining power. We also found that the marginal
effects of a wife’s income became lower when the relative power of the wife and
husband was controlled. These results imply that the effects of an increase in a wife’s
income will be limited if her relative power is weak.
Examining the determinants and effects of power has some important policy
implications. The evidence for a larger impact of a mother’s income on children
implies that when a policy that increases household income is implemented, it is
more effective to make it accrue to women than to men. Our analysis may further
imply that the effect of a household’s income will be multiplicative if women’s
control of household resources empowers women. If power affects outcome mainly
through an increase in total household income, it may be more important to
increase income than to shift power toward women. However, if all that matters is the
underlying power, then giving money to women without changing their bargaining
power will not meet our expectations.
The data used here, although collected in Indonesia, are appropriate for our
research concern since they provide many responses to questions regarding the decision-
making processes on various expenditures from food and clothes to durable goods.
This unique feature of the data enables us to directly measure power distribution within
a household, and thus to shed light on the best policy options for providing subsidies
to low-income families by showing how the bargaining power of wives affects the
subsidy.
The study has important policy implications. If women’s bargaining power has a
specific impact on educational expenditures for children, policy reforms and interven-
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tions can take this into account in order to influence intrahousehold decision making
and educational expenditures. The amount of money injected by the government into
households can have very different implications for children’s education. Higher chil-
dren’s welfare occurs in households in which the woman has a higher bargaining
power. In other words, subsidies such as direct money transfers or access to educational
institutions can have varying impacts on the welfare of children depending on the gender
of the main decision-maker. In any case, a rise in the bargaining power of women is
likely to conflict with traditional social norms regarding gender roles. Thus, careful
consideration is required for policies that increase the bargaining power of women.
Our empirical results verify that women are empowered by work opportunities
and by having their own income. Many studies and experiences have found that distri-
butional effects are larger when women are recipients of a subsidy. Our study shows
that programs for the development of women’s rights will multiply the effects of aid
programs. We believe that these results, although based on Indonesian data, have
meaningful implications for income-subsidy policies in Korea.
Our analysis is limited in several aspects, among them the fact that the relationship
between decision making and power has still not been investigated. Given the high
possibility of separate spheres or roles within a household, the power variable based
on the concept of influence in decision making can be misleading. We believe our
measurements were better than previous studies in that ours directly measured
women’s voice in decision making, while others used indirect measures such as non-
labor income.
Another possible limitation of our study is that Indonesian survey data were used.
A difference in social customs governing wife-husband-children relationships and
resource allocation within households may exist between Indonesia and Korea. Our
research presents only some of the evidence on the effect of women’s rights on social
welfare. To get a more complete picture, future studies with more accurate data and a
different approach are required.
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APPENDIX: THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON DECISION MAKING
In your household, who makes decisions about each of these expenditures? 
(Circle all that apply.)
A. Food eaten at home A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Z
B. Routine household purchases such 
as cleaning supplies A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Z
C. Your clothes A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Z
D. Your spouse’s clothes A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Z
E. Your children’s clothes A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P W Z
F. Your children’s education A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P W Z
G. Your children’s health A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P W Z
H. Large expensive purchases for the 
household (e.g., refrigerator or TV) A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Z
I. Giving money to your parents/family A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P X Z
J. Giving money to your spouse’s 
parents/family A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P X Z
K. Gifts for parties/weddings A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Z
L. Money for monthly arisan 
(savings lottery) A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P X Z
M. Money for monthly savings A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P X Z
N. Time the husband spends socializing A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Z
O. Time the wife spends socializing A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Z
P. Do you/your spouse work? A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P V Z
Q. Do you and your spouse use 
contraception? A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Y Z
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